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Pentagon Disputes in Disguise: What the Fine Print of the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Actually Says

Congress now reviews a Section 123 agreement that experts say is better on safeguards than initially leaked—but still a dramatic break from 50 years of nonproliferation norms.

The Trump administration transmitted the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress on August 24, triggering a mandatory 90-day review period under the Atomic Energy Act. The deal, signed July 22, would allow U.S. companies priority access to supply Saudi Arabia's emerging nuclear program and opens a pathway for the kingdom to eventually enrich uranium domestically after a two-year feasibility study. The agreement has drawn sharp criticism from nonproliferation experts and Democratic lawmakers, who argue it abandons the so-called "gold standard" (exemplified by the UAE's enrichment-free deal) in favor of unprecedented flexibility for a kingdom long suspected of nuclear ambitions. President Trump has separately conditioned the deal's advancement on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing with Israel—a step Riyadh has publicly declined without progress toward Palestinian statehood. War on the Rocks argues the final text is significantly stronger than initial press leaks suggested. The bilateral safeguards agreement requires Saudi Arabia to provide the IAEA with declarations on research and development activities beyond what standard treaties require, accept short-notice inspections at covered sites, and permit the agency to verify the "correctness and completeness" of its statements. Saudi Arabia also formally rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol exemption in 2024, ending years of reduced inspection burden. The IAEA's Rafael Grossi publicly stated in September that the bilateral verification provisions closely approach the Additional Protocol's scope—at least for sensitive activities like enrichment, conversion, and reprocessing. But critics contend these gains are modest relative to the core concession: allowing enrichment on Saudi soil. The deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the Additional Protocol, the international gold standard for intrusive inspections of undeclared sites. Instead, a bilateral U.S.-Saudi inspection regime applies only to facilities involved in joint U.S.-Saudi activities—leaving uranium mining, milling, and unilateral Saudi R&D outside its reach. Experts note that Saudi Arabia has historically dragged negotiations (the talks span more than a decade) and refused enrichment bans; Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated he will pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does. The agreement permits uranium enrichment up to 20 percent purity, a significant escalation from previous U.S. policy denying such technology to non-nuclear states. Congress has 90 days of continuous session to pass a joint resolution of disapproval; absent that, the deal takes effect. The Trump administration submitted portions of the agreement in classified form, limiting public and congressional review. Some Democratic lawmakers and nonproliferation groups have already signaled intent to introduce a disapproval resolution, but overriding a presidential veto would require two-thirds majorities in both chambers.